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The	   Qualification	   Directive,	   adopted	   by	   the	   Council	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   in	  
2004,	   creates	   a	   legal	   obligation	   for	   Member	   States	   to	   grant	   subsidiary	  
protection	  to	  those	  persons	  who	  do	  not	  qualify	  for	  refugee	  status	  but	  who	  are	  in	  
need	   of	   protection	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   other	   international	   obligations	   of	  Member	  
States.	   An	   element	   of	   the	   Qualification	   Directive	   relates	   to	   protection	   from	  
serious	  harm,	  as	  defined	  in	  Article	  15(c)	  of	  the	  Directive.	  This	  article	  analyses	  the	  
meaning	  and	  application	  of	  Article	  15(c)	  in	  the	  UK	  through	  a	  selection	  of	  cases	  
from	   failed	  Afghan	   asylum	   seekers	   in	   Kent,	   and	   identifies	   the	   difficulty	   courts	  
have	   had	   in	   interpreting	   and	   applying	   the	   provision.	   It	   stresses	   the	   need	   for	  
clarification	  of	  the	  terms	  of	  Article	  15(c)	  and	  the	  impact	  its	  lack	  of	  clarity	  has	  on	  
those	  applying	  for	  subsidiary	  protection	  and	  those	  in	  the	  courts	  adjudicating	  on	  




The	  2004	  Qualification	  Directive	  was	  introduced	  as	  part	  of	  the	  framework	  for	  
a	  Common	  European	  Asylum	  System1	  and	  aims	   to	  harmonise	   the	   criteria	  by	  
which	  Member	   States	  define	  who	  qualifies	   as	   a	   refugee	  or	   are	  otherwise	   in	  
need	  of	  international	  protection.	  Article	  15(c),	  which	  defines	  protection	  from	  
serious	  harm	  where	  there	  is	  an	  individual	  threat	  to	  a	  civilian’s	  life	  or	  person	  by	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1 	  UNHCR,	   ‘Gaining	   Asylum	   in	   the	   EU’	   <http://www.unhcr-­‐centraleurope.org/en/what-­‐we-­‐do/ensuring-­‐legal-­‐
protection/eu-­‐asylum-­‐policy.html>	  accessed	  21	  April	  2014	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reason	   of	   indiscriminate	   violence	   or	   internal	   armed	   conflict,2 	  has	   been	   a	  
subject	   of	   contention	   since	   its	   introduction.	   Disagreements	   over	   its	  
transposition,	   interpretation	   and	   implementation	   into	   the	   legal	   systems	   of	  
Member	  States	  have	   led	  to	  confusion	  surrounding	   its	  meaning	  and	  purpose.	  
Article	   15(c)	   begs	   the	  question:	   does	   it	   actually	   provide	   rights	   to	   individuals	  
seeking	   subsidiary	   protection	   as	   a	   result	   of	   international	   or	   internal	   armed	  
conflict	   in	   their	  home	  countries?	  And	   if	  not,	  what	   is	   its	  purpose?	  This	  paper	  
aims	   to	   discuss	   that	   question	   through	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   interpretation	   and	  
application	  of	  Article	  15(c)	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  selected	  other	  EU	  Member	  States.	  	  In	  
order	  to	  do	  so,	  the	  paper	  will	  focus	  on	  UK	  Country	  Guidance	  cases	  specifically	  
dealing	  with	   the	   question	   of	   Article	   15(c)	   and	   a	   selection	   of	   cases	   of	   failed	  
asylum	  seekers	  in	  Kent.	  
	  
‘On	  Any	  Reading,	  Article	  15(c)	  is	  Tortuously	  Worded’:3	  The	  Importance	  of	  
Definition	  
The	   statement	   above	   captures	   the	   difficulty	   faced	   by	   many	   courts	   in	  
determining	  the	  meaning	  and	  proper	  application	  of	  Article	  15(c).	  To	  delve	  into	  
the	   source	   of	   this	   remark,	   it	   is	   worth	   looking	   at	   the	   provision	   itself.	   Article	  
15(c)	  defines	  ‘serious	  harm’	  as:	  ‘serious	  and	  individual	  threat	  to	  a	  civilian’s	  life	  
or	  person	  by	  reason	  of	  indiscriminate	  violence	  in	  situations	  of	  international	  or	  
internal	   armed	   conflict’.	   An	   initial	   observation	   is	   that	   the	   wording	   is	   prima	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Council	   Directive	   (EC)	   2004/83	   on	  minimum	   standards	   for	   the	   qualification	   and	   status	   of	   third	   country	   nationals	   or	  
stateless	   persons	   as	   refugees	   or	   as	   persons	   who	   otherwise	   need	   international	   protection	   and	   the	   content	   of	   the	  
protection	  granted	  (the	  EC	  Qualification	  Directive),	  Article	  15(c)	  
3	  KH	  (Article	  15(c)	  Qualification	  Directive)	  Iraq	  CG	  [2008]	  UKAIT	  00023,	  [32]	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facie	   contradictory.	  How	   can	   you	   prove	   an	   ‘individual	   threat’	   as	   a	   result	   of	  
‘indiscriminate	   violence’?	   McAdam	   articulates	   this	   difficulty,	   stating:	   ‘The	  
individual	   requirement	   cannot	   logically	  mean	   that	   a	   person	  must	  be	   singled	  
out	  within	  a	  situation	  of	  indiscriminate	  violence,	  since	  to	  require	  this	  would	  be	  
contrary	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  violence	  that	  is	  indiscriminate.’4	  	  
This	  problem	  was	  recognised	  by	  the	  Dutch	  courts	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Elgafaji,5	  
who	  requested	  a	  preliminary	  ruling	  from	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  on	  the	  
meaning	  of	  ‘serious	  and	  individual	  threat	  to	  life	  or	  person’	  with	  specific	  focus	  
on	  the	  words	   ‘individual	   threat’	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	   the	  Directive.	  The	  Court	  
defined	  ‘individual’	  as	  covering	  harm	  to	  civilians	  irrespective	  of	  their	  identity,	  
where	   the	   degree	   of	   indiscriminate	   violence…reaches	   such	   a	   high	   level	   that	  
substantial	   grounds	   are	   shown	   that	   a	   civilian…solely	   on	   account	   of	   his	  
presence	  on	  the	  territory…faces	  a	   real	   risk	  of	  being	  subjected	  to	   the	  serious	  
threat	  described	  in	  15(c).6	  
The	  concept	  of	  a	  threat	  of	  harm	  that	  is	  irrespective	  of	  a	  person’s	  identity	  
seems	   to	   be	   a	   reasonable	   clarification	   of	   the	   term	   ‘individual’	   since,	   if	   the	  
opposite	   were	   the	   case,	   then	   a	   person	   could	   qualify	   for	   consideration	   of	  
protection	   as	   a	   refugee	   under	   the	   Refugee	   Convention	   reasons	   of	   a	   fear	   of	  
persecution	   due	   to	   race,	   religion,	   nationality	   or	  membership	   of	   a	   particular	  
social	   group.	   Article	   15(c)	   excludes	   these	   Convention	   reasons	   as	   the	  
assessment	   of	   protection	   under	   15(c)	   is	   only	   to	   be	   carried	   out	   once	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Jane	  McAdam,	  Complementary	  Protection	  in	  International	  Refugee	  Law	  (OUP	  2007)	  72	  
5	  Case	  C-­‐465/07	  Elgafaji	  v	  Staatssecretaris	  van	  Justitie	  (Elgafaji)	  [2009]	  1	  WLR	  2100	  
6	  ibid	  [35]	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applicant	  has	  failed	  to	  establish	  a	  need	  for	  refugee	  protection	  and	  therefore	  
seeks	  protection	  by	  other	  means.7	  	  
The	   definition	   of	   ‘individual’	   given	   in	   the	   Elgafaji	   case	   remains	  
ambiguous,	   however,	   as	   what	   qualifies	   as	   a	   threat	   of	   harm	   to	   civilians	  
irrespective	  of	  their	   identity	  and	  as	  a	  result	  of	  violence	  that	   is	   indiscriminate	  
(another	   concept	   with	   ambiguous	   meaning)	   still	   remains	   to	   be	   seen	   in	   the	  
courts.	  One	  may	  ask,	   if	  a	  threat	  of	  harm	  as	  a	  result	  of	  factors	  particular	  to	  a	  
person’s	  identity	  could	  place	  them	  under	  protection	  for	  a	  Convention	  reason,	  
then	  what	   reasons,	   irrespective	  of	  a	  person’s	   identity	  will	  place	   them	  under	  
subsidiary	  protection	  to	  satisfy	  Article	  15(c)	  of	  the	  Qualification	  Directive?	  The	  
definition	   given	   in	   the	   Elgafaji	   case	   therefore	   proves	   to	   be	   frustratingly	  
unhelpful,	   as	   it	   does	   not	   facilitate	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   ‘individual’	   for	  
the	  purposes	  required	  by	  the	  courts.	  
	  
Proving	  Individual	  Threat:	  A	  Test	  of	  Exceptionality?	  
Further	   to	   determining	   the	  meaning	   of	   ‘individual	   threat’	   is	   the	   burden	   on	  
applicants	   to	   prove	   that	   threat.	   Taking	   a	   specific	   look	   at	   cases	   from	  
Afghanistan	   and	   the	   situation	   there,	   the	   UK	   Border	   Agency’s	   Operational	  
Guidance	  Note	  (OGN)	  on	  Afghanistan	  made	  the	  comment	  that	  to	  establish	  a	  
claim	   under	   Article	   15(c)	   it	   is	   necessary	   for	   a	   claimant	   ‘to	   establish	   that	  
particular	  factors	  place	  him	  or	  her	  at	  additional	  risk	  above	  that	  which	  applies	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Gov.uk,	  ‘Humanitarian	  Protection’	  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/257431/huma-­‐prot.pdf>	  accessed	  
23	  April	  2014	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to	  the	  civilian	  population	  generally’.8	  	  This	  requirement	  originates	  in	  Recital	  26	  
of	  the	  Directive,	  which	  holds	  that	  ‘risks	  to	  which	  a	  population	  of	  a	  country	  or	  a	  
section	   of	   the	   population	   is	   generally	   exposed	   do	   normally	   not	   create	   in	  
themselves	  an	  individual	  threat	  which	  would	  qualify	  as	  serious	  harm’.9	  	  
In	  each	  of	  the	  Country	  Guidance	  cases	  relating	  to	  Afghanistan,	  claimants	  
are	   consistently	   rejected	   for	   failing	   to	  produce	  evidence	   that	   they	  are	   at	   an	  
‘additional	   risk’	   or	   at	   risk	   by	   reason	   of	   factors	   particular	   to	   their	  
circumstances.	   In	   the	  case	  of	  GS	  Afghanistan,	  specifically	  where	  a	  country	   is	  
not	  found	  to	  be	  in	  a	  situation	  of	   internal	  armed	  conflict,	  that	  applicant	  must	  
prove	  that	  they	  are	  at	  serious	  risk	  over	  and	  above	  others.10	  This	  would	  appear	  
to	   place	   a	   burden	   on	   the	   applicant	   to	   prove	   exceptional	   circumstances	   in	  
order	  to	  be	  considered	  for	  protection.	  However,	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  after	  the	  
case	  of	  Elgafaji11	  (upon	  which	  many	  cases	  currently	  going	  through	  the	  courts	  
rely),12	  while	   finding	   the	   need	   for	   exceptional	   circumstances,	   did	   not	   find	   a	  
need	  to	  define	  a	  test	  of	  exceptionality.	  They	  simply	  stated	  that	  the	  use	  of	  the	  
word	  ‘exceptional’	  in	  the	  case	  was	  to	  stress	  that	  	  
it	  is	  not	  every	  armed	  conflict	  which	  will	  attract	  the	  protection	  of	  Article	  15(c),	  
but	   only	   one	   where	   the	   level	   of	   violence	   is	   such	   that,	   without	   anything	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  UKBA,	  Operational	  Guidance	  Note:	  Afghanistan	  v9,	  20	  February	  2012,	  3.6.12	  
9	  EC	  Qualification	  Directive,	  Recital	  26	  
10	  GS	  (Article	  15(c):	  indiscriminate	  violence)	  Afghanistan	  CG	  [2009]	  UKAIT	  00044	  
11	  Elgafaji	  [2009]	  1	  WLR	  2100	  
12	  Based	  on	  evidence	  from	  the	  judgments	  from	  UK	  Country	  Guidance	  cases	  and	  the	  cases	  from	  failed	  asylum	  seekers	  in	  
Kent	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render	  them	  a	  particular	  target,	  civilians	  face	  real	  risks	  to	  their	  life	  or	  personal	  
safety.13	  
In	   relation	   to	   this,	   the	  UNHCR	  has	   commented	   that,	   looking	  at	   the	  UK	  
authority	   on	   the	   issue,	   ‘it	   would	   appear	   that	   such	   levels	   of	   violence	   are	   in	  
practice	  considered	  to	  be	  exceptional’.14	  So	  in	  practice,	  exceptionality	  must	  be	  
proved,	  but	  no	  formal	  ‘exceptionality	  test’	  has	  been	  introduced.	  An	  argument	  
could	  easily	  be	  made	  here,	  that	   introducing	  a	  test	  of	  exceptionality	  (or	  what	  
would	   constitute	   ‘exceptional	   circumstances’	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   protection	  
under	  Article	  15(c))	  would	  provide	  concrete	  criteria	  by	  which	  applicants	  could	  
produce	  evidence	  to	  support	  their	  case,	  and	  courts	  could	  assess	  a	  case	  next	  to	  
a	  stable	  set	  of	  requirements.	  Why	  has	  the	  concept	  of	  an	  ‘exceptionality	  test’	  
not	   been	   considered	   as	   a	   viable	   method	   for	   clarifying	   the	   burden	   of	   proof	  
resting	  on	  applicants?15	  
Courts’	   attempts	   to	   provide	   definition	   to	   the	  wording	   in	   Article	   15(c),	  
rather	   than	   clarifying	   its	  meaning,	   appear	  only	   to	  have	   left	   a	   trail	   of	   further	  
confusion	   and	  doubt	   as	   to	   its	   correct	   application	   and	  purpose.	  How	  do	   you	  
establish	  an	  additional	  risk	  above	  that	  of	  the	  general	  population	  by	  particular	  
factors,	   irrespective	  of	   identity,	  and	  yet	  satisfy	   the	  need	   for	   the	  risk	   to	  have	  
resulted	   from	   violence	   that	   is	   indiscriminate?	   Additionally,	   if	   there	   is	   no	  
exceptionality	  test,	  then	  what	  constitutes	  ‘exceptional	  circumstances’	  for	  the	  
purposes	  of	  proving	  additional	  individual	  risk?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  QD	  and	  AH	  v	  SSHD	  [2009]	  EWCA	  Civ	  620	  [25]	  
14	  UNHCR,	   Safe	   At	   Last?	   Law	   and	   Practice	   in	   Selected	   EU	   Member	   States	   with	   Respect	   to	   Asylum-­‐Seekers	   Fleeing	  
Indiscriminate	  Violence	  (Geneva	  2009)	  32	  
15	  Elgafaji	  [2009]	  1	  WLR	  2100	  –	  this	   idea	  was	  a	  general	  observation	  gleaned	  from	  assessment	  of	  the	  case	  and	  does	  not	  
originate	  from	  any	  specific	  element	  of	  the	  case.	  




Does	  Article	  15(c)	  Provide	  any	  Additional	  Scope	  of	  Protection	  or	  is	  it	  Merely	  
Complementary	  to	  that	  Afforded	  by	  Article	  15(a)	  and	  (b)?	  
Another	  subject	  of	  contention	  relating	  to	  Article	  15(c)	  is	  whether	  it	  requires	  a	  
special	   standard	   of	   proof	   different	   from	   that	   applying	   in	   other	   cases	   under	  
Article	  15	  (namely,	  cases	  under	  Article	  15(a)	  and	  (b)).16	  	  Looking	  specifically	  at	  
the	  wording	  of	  each	  provision,	  15(a)	  defines	  serious	  harm	  as	  ‘death	  penalty	  or	  
execution’,	   and	   15(b)	   as	   ‘torture	   or	   inhuman	   or	   degrading	   treatment	   or	  
punishment	  of	  an	  applicant	  in	  the	  country	  of	  origin’.17	  When	  comparing	  this	  to	  
the	  wording	  in	  15(c),	  a	  marked	  difference	  can	  be	  seen	  through	  the	  use	  of	  the	  
word	  ‘threat’	  in	  15(c).	  Where	  (a)	  and	  (b)	  are	  defining	  types	  of	  actual	  harm,	  (c)	  
covers	  a	  threat	  of	  harm.	  Helene	  Lambert	  and	  Theo	  Farrell,	   in	  their	  article	  on	  
the	  ‘The	  Changing	  Character	  of	  Armed	  Conflict’,	  make	  the	  comment	  that	  ‘(c)	  
has	  an	  added	  value	  being	   that	   it	   is	   concerned	  not	   just	  with	  actual	  harm	  but	  
also	  with	  a	  lesser	  form	  of	  harm,	  that	  is,	  a	  threat	  of	  harm’.18	  It	  would	  appear,	  
therefore,	  that	  (c)	  covers	  a	  category	  of	  harm	  separate	  to	  those	  covered	  by	  (a)	  
and	  (b)	  and	  therefore	  could	  be	  considered	  separately	  from	  them.19	  	  
However,	   in	   practice	   this	   appears	  more	   difficult.	   In	   reading	   through	   a	  
selection	  of	  cases	  of	  failed	  Afghan	  asylum	  seekers	  in	  Kent,	  a	  common	  pattern	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Paul	  Tiedemann,	  ‘Subsidiary	  Protection	  and	  the	  Function	  of	  Article	  15(c)	  of	  the	  Qualification	  Directive’	  (2012)	  31	  RSQ	  
124	  
17	  EC	  Qualification	  Directive,	  Article	  15(a)	  and	  (b)	  
18	  Helene	   Lambert	   and	   Theo	   Farrell,	   ‘The	   Changing	   Character	   of	   Armed	   Conflict	   and	   the	   Implications	   for	   Refugee	  
Protection	  Jurisprudence’	  (2010)	  22	  IJRL	  242	  
19	  ibid	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in	  the	  refusal	  letters	  (in	  the	  cases	  where	  Article	  15(c)	  was	  even	  considered20)	  
was	  the	  assessment	  of	  15(c)	  under	  the	  heading	  of	  Protection	  under	  Articles	  2	  
and	  3	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (ECHR).	  There	  are	  several	  
issues	   with	   this.	   To	   establish	   some	   context,	   it	   must	   be	   understood	   that	  
Member	   States,	   in	   accordance	   with	   Recital	   25	   of	   the	   Directive,	   are	   to	  
introduce	   criteria	   for	   eligibility	   for	   subsidiary	   protection	   drawing	   from	  
international	   obligations	   under	   human	   rights	   instruments	   and	   existing	  
practices	   in	   that	  Member	   State.21	  This	   is	   already	   in	   practice	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  
interpretation	  of	  15(a)	  and	  (b),	  as	  their	  wording	  is	  almost	  identical	  to	  that	  of	  
Articles	  2	  and	  3	  ECHR.22	  Therefore,	  given	  the	  provisions	  in	  Recital	  25,	  it	  makes	  
sense	   when	   attempting	   to	   establish	   harm	   under	   15(a)	   and	   (b),	   to	   interpret	  
them	  in	  light	  of	  Articles	  2	  and	  3	  ECHR.	  However,	  the	  same	  cannot	  be	  said	  for	  
15(c)	  whose	  wording	  is	  not	  replicated	  in	  any	  Article	  of	  the	  ECHR.	  Additionally	  
if	   15(c)	   is	   held	   to	   cover	   a	   ‘lesser’	   form	   of	   harm	   than	   (a)	   and	   (b),	   then	   this	  
argues	   that	   it	   has	   additional	   scope,	   and	   there	   is	   no	   logical	   reason	   why	   it	  
should	   be	   considered	   under	   those	   headings,	   and	   not	   in	   its	   own	   right.	   This	  
argument	  was	  reiterated	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Elgafaji	  where	  the	  comment	  was	  made	  
that:	   ‘article	   15(c)	   is	   an	   autonomous	   concept	  whose	   interpretation	  must	   be	  
carried	   out	   independently	   and	   without	   prejudice	   to	   fundamental	   rights	   as	  
guaranteed	  by	  the	  ECHR’.23	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Article	  15(c)	  was	  considered	  in	  12	  out	  of	  20	  cases	  and	  out	  of	  those	  12,	  only	  one	  considered	  15(c)	  as	  a	  separate	  category	  
of	  protection	  from	  serious	  harm	  as	  defined	  in	  (a)	  and	  (b)	  or	  Articles	  2	  and	  3	  ECHR.	  	  
21EC	  Qualification	  Directive,	  Recital	  25	  	  
22	  Tiedemann	  (n	  16)	  120	  
23	  Elgafaji	  [2009]	  1	  WLR	  2100	  [28]	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Countering	  this,	  a	  strong	  argument	  can	  be	  made	  for	  believing	  that	  15(c)	  
does	  not	  actually	  provide	  any	  additional	  scope	  or	  protection	  outside	  of	  (a)	  and	  
(b)	  and	   therefore	   it	   is	   correct	   to	   consider	   (c)	  under	  Articles	  2	  and	  3	  ECHR.24	  
One	   argument	   made	   in	   the	   case	   of	   HH	   and	   Others	   is	   that	   ‘in	   certain	  
circumstances,	   a	   threat	   to	   a	   person	   can	   constitute	   inhuman	   or	   degrading	  
treatment	   or	   punishment,	   contrary	   to	   article	   3	   ECHR,	   and	   thus	   constitute	  
serious	   harm	   within	   Article	   15(b)’. 25 	  	   Essentially,	   the	   judge	   in	   this	   case	  
contends	   that	   the	  word	   ‘threat’	   in	   15(c)	  must	   lead	   to	   the	   types	   of	   harm	   as	  
described	  in	  (a)	  and	  (b)	  and	  therefore	  (c)	  can	  never	  be	  divorced	  from	  the	  two	  
or	  have	  any	  application	  broader	  than,	  or	  independent	  of	  them.	  But	  again,	  this	  
interpretation	  seriously	  calls	  into	  question	  the	  purpose	  of	  15(c).	  If	  it	  can	  have	  
no	  application	  broader	  than	  (a)	  and	  (b),	  and	  one	  of	  these	  must	  be	  established	  
in	  order	  to	  establish	  harm	  under	  (c),	  then	  why	  not	  just	  incorporate	  the	  type	  of	  
harm	  in	  (c)	  into	  the	  provisions	  in	  (a)	  and	  (b)?	  Why	  have	  Article	  15(c)	  at	  all?26	  
Another	  relevant	  comment	  was	  made	   in	  the	  case	  of	  AK	  Afghanistan	   in	  
relation	  to	  the	  consideration	  of	  Article	  15(c)	  under	  Articles	  2	  and	  3	  ECHR:	  to	  
assess	  whether	  Article	   15(c)	   is	   engaged,	   should	   not	   lead	   to	   judicial	   decision	  
makers	   going	   straight	   to	  Article	   15(c).	   The	   normal	   course	   should	   be	   to	   deal	  
with	  the	  issue	  of	  refugee	  eligibility,	  subsidiary	  protection	  eligibility	  and	  Article	  
3	  ECHR	  in	  that	  order.27	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Tiedemann	  (n	  16)	  123	  
25	  HH	  and	  Others	  (Mogadishu:	  armed	  conflict:	  risk)	  Somalia	  CG	  [2008]	  UKAIT	  00022	  [332]	  
26	  Tiedemann	  (n	  16)	  124	  –	  general	  observation	  from	  the	  multiple	  arguments	  put	  forth	  in	  the	  article.	  
27	  AK	  (Article	  15(c))	  Afghanistan	  CG	  [2012]	  UKUT	  00163	  (IAC)	  [249]	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This	  has	  particular	  relevance	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  cases	  of	  failed	  asylum	  
seekers	  in	  Kent.	  Out	  of	  20	  examined	  cases,	  four	  did	  not	  even	  consider	  Article	  
15(c)	  in	  determining	  eligibility	  for	  subsidiary	  protection,	  and	  in	  those	  that	  did,	  
only	   one	   considered	   it	   separately,	   and	   as	   having	   additional	   scope	   for	  
protection	   beyond	   Articles	   2	   and	   3	   ECHR.	   Each	   of	   the	   remaining	   cases	  
considered	  Article	   15(c)	   under	   the	  headings	  of	   protection	   afforded	  by	   ECHR	  
rights.	   This	   directly	   contradicts	   the	   statement	   in	   AK	   that	   consideration	   of	  
Article	   3	   ECHR	   is	   to	   be	   dealt	   with	   after	   considering	   whether	   a	   claimant	   is	  
eligible	  for	  subsidiary	  protection.	   It	   is	   fairly	  clear	  from	  this	  that	  courts	  are	  at	  
sea	   as	   to	   how	  and	  when	   to	   apply	  Article	   15(c)	  when	   assessing	   eligibility	   for	  
subsidiary	   protection.	   Does	   it	   provide	   additional	   scope	   to	   Article	   15(a)	   and	  
(b)?	  Should	  it	  be	  interpreted	  separately	  from	  Article	  2	  and	  3	  ECHR?	  	  
	  
What	  does	  ‘Indiscriminate	  Violence	  in	  Situations	  of	  International	  or	  Internal	  
Armed	  Conflict’	  mean	  and	  how	  is	  it	  Being	  Applied?	  
The	  definition	  of	  ‘internal	  armed	  conflict’	  varies	  depending	  on	  which	  country	  a	  
Member	  State	  is	  adjudicating	  on	  in	  a	  given	  case.28	  This	  is	  to	  be	  expected,	  given	  
that	  the	  Qualification	  Directive	  is	  to	  be	  transposed	  into	  each	  Member	  State’s	  
national	  laws	  at	  their	  discretion.29	  But	  does	  this	  cause	  more	  harm	  than	  good?	  
In	  an	  argument	  made	  for	  the	  extension	  of	  subsidiary	  protection,	  the	  comment	  
was	  made	   that	   ‘the	   term	   “internal	   armed	   conflict”	   is	   understood	   unevenly,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Lyra	   Jakuleviciene,	   ‘Is	   there	   a	   need	   for	   an	   extension	   of	   subsidiary	   protection	   in	   the	   European	   Union	   Qualification	  
Directive?’	  (2010)	  2(120)	  Jurisprudencija	  215	  	  
29	  This	   is	  a	  general	  provision	  of	  EU	   law	  –	  Directives	  are	  not	  directly	  effective	  and	  must	  be	  transposed	   into	  the	  national	  
laws	  of	  each	  Member	  State,	  at	  their	  discretion.	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since	  there	  is	  no	  agreed	  definition	  of	  it	  in	  international	  law’.30	  This	  can	  cause	  
difficulties	   in	  achieving	   the	  objective	  of	   the	  Directive	  which	   is	   to	   ‘harmonise	  
the	   criteria	   by	   which	   Member	   States	   define	   who	   qualifies	   as	   a	   refugee	   or	  
other	   forms	   of	   protection’. 31 	  For	   example,	   interpretations	   in	   different	  
Member	   States	   have	   achieved	   different	   results:	   ‘the	   situation	   in	   Iraq	   was	  
considered	  as	  “internal	  armed	  conflict”	  in	  France,	  but	  not	  in	  Sweden	  where	  it	  
was	  described	  as	  “severe	  conflict”’.32	  The	  argument	  could	  be	  made	  here,	  that	  
where	  certain	  Member	  States	  are	  known	  to	  be	  granting	  subsidiary	  protection	  
to	  individuals	  as	  a	  result	  of	  internal	  armed	  conflict,	  but	  other	  Member	  States	  
are	  not,	  a	  floodgates	  scenario	  can	  materialise.33	  Additionally,	  this	  difference	  in	  
interpretation	   appears	   to	   accord	   some	   individuals	   subsidiary	   protection	   and	  
not	  others.	   This	   is	   purely	  on	   the	  basis	   that	  one	  Member	   State,	   due	   to	   their	  
discretion	   in	   interpretation,	   considers	   a	   country	   to	   be	   in	   a	   state	   of	   internal	  
armed	  conflict	  and	  another	  does	  not,	  but	  the	  violence	  in	  that	  country	  remains	  
the	  same	  regardless	  of	  the	  characterisation	  of	  that	  violence	  as	  ‘internal	  armed	  
conflict’	  –	  is	  this	  fair?	  Is	  it	  harmonising	  the	  criteria	  used	  by	  Member	  States	  to	  
determine	  who	  qualifies	  as	  a	  person	  in	  need	  of	  subsidiary	  protection?	  
In	   UK	   cases,	   specifically	   the	   case	   of	   GS	   Afghanistan,	   indiscriminate	  
violence	  was	  described	  as	  ‘if	  a	  suicide	  bomber	  were	  to	  attempt	  to	  assassinate	  
one	  individual	  in	  a	  crowded	  market	  place’	  or	  ‘the	  bombing	  of	  insurgents	  who	  
were	   sheltering	   in	   a	   school,	   or	   other	   area	   known	   to	   be	   populated	   by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Jakuleviciene	  (n	  28)	  226	  
31	  UNHCR,	  European	  Council	  on	  Refugees	  and	  Exiles,	  ‘Brochure	  on	  the	  Qualification	  Directive’	  (2011)	  
32	  Jakuleviciene	  (n	  28)	  226	  
33	  ibid	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civilians’.34	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  assumption	  that	  civilian	  casualties	  in	  a	  particular	  
area	   are	   a	  determining	   factor	   in	  whether	   a	   country	   is	   in	   a	   state	  of	   ‘internal	  
armed	  conflict’	  or	  an	   individual	   is	   at	   risk	  of	   ‘indiscriminate	  violence’.	   Indeed	  
civilian	   casualties	   ‘generally	   provide	   a	   truer	   estimate	   of	   the	   severity	   of	   an	  
armed	   conflict’,35	  however,	   as	   Lambert	   and	   Farrell	   argue,	   there	   is	   a	   ‘human	  
security	  paradigm’,	  which	  also	  ought	  to	  be	  considered.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  
severity	  of	  an	  internal	  armed	  conflict	  ‘needs	  to	  be	  assessed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
broader	   social	   impacts’.36	  The	   human	   security	   paradigm	   assesses	  whether	   a	  
country	  is	  in	  a	  state	  of	  armed	  conflict	  through	  assessing	  both	  the	  numbers	  of	  
people	   displaced	   from	   their	   homes,	   and	   chronic	   state	   failure	   leading	   to	  
unsustainable	   communities	   through	   lack	   of	   basic	   services	   and	   a	   collapse	   of	  
infrastructure.37	  Currently,	  the	  UK	  courts	  when	  dealing	  with	  Article	  15(c)	  have	  
only	   considered	   direct	   threats	   to	   life	   or	   person	   in	   terms	   of	   exposure	   to	  
indiscriminate	  violence	  as	  a	  result	  of	  armed	  conflict	  or	  criminal	  acts,	  therefore	  
using	  civilian	  casualties	  as	  the	  ‘measuring	  stick’	  for	  determining	  the	  severity	  of	  
a	  conflict.38	  	  However,	  Lambert	  and	  Farrell	  bring	  a	  very	  compelling	  argument	  
that	  indirect	  threats,	  such	  as	  those	  contained	  in	  the	  human	  security	  paradigm,	  
should	   be	   considered	   when	   assessing	   whether	   a	   country	   is	   in	   a	   state	   of	  
internal	   armed	   conflict	   and	  when	  assessing	   the	   severity	   of	   the	   conflict.	   This	  
would	  consequently	  provide	  Article	  15(c)	  with	  the	  additional	  scope	  it	  requires,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  GS	  (Article	  15(c):	  indiscriminate	  violence)	  Afghanistan	  CG	  [2009]	  UKAIT	  00044	  [62]	  
35	  Lambert	   and	   Farrell	   (n	   18)	   267	   –	   a	   ‘truer’	   estimate	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   traditional	   characterisation	   of	   armed	   conflict	  
through	  the	  numbers	  of	  battle	  casualties.	  
36	  ibid	  267	  
37	  ibid	  270	  
38	  ibid	  266	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and	  would	  widen	  the	  previously	  narrow	  interpretation	   it	  has	  received	  at	  the	  
hands	  of	  judges.39	  	  
With	  specific	  focus	  on	  Afghanistan,	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  risk	  to	  civilians	  
in	   terms	   of	   indirect	   threats,	   cases	   have	   made	   comments	   on	   the	   current	  
cultural	   and	   political	   state	   of	   Afghanistan. 40 	  The	   case	   of	   AK	   stated:	  
‘Afghanistan	   is	   not	   only	   war-­‐stricken;	   it	   is	   riven	   by	   ethnic	   frictions,	   political	  
factionalism,	  high	  levels	  of	  poverty,	  impunity,	  serious	  abuses	  of	  human	  rights	  
by	   both	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	   actors,	   ineffective	   governance,	   high	   levels	   of	  
corruption’41	  and	   the	   list	   goes	  on.	   In	   the	   same	   case,	   objective	   evidence	  was	  
given	   from	   an	   Integrated	   Regional	   Information	   Networks	   report	   from	   July	  
2011	  that	  ‘some	  70%	  of	  the	  urban	  population	  of	  Kabul	  live	  in	  unplanned	  areas	  
or	   in	   illegal	   settlements,	   with	   poor	   sanitation	   and	   lack	   of	   access	   to	   safe	  
drinking	  water’.42	  While	  that	  particular	  statement	  only	  relates	  to	  one	  area	  of	  
Afghanistan,	  it	  is	  also	  the	  area	  where	  applicants	  are	  most	  commonly	  sent	  for	  
relocation.	   Fuelling	   the	   argument	   for	   a	   broader	   application	   of	   Article	   15(c),	  
each	  of	  the	  indirect	  threats	  mentioned	  above	  could	  be	  assessed	  as	  elements	  
pertaining	   to	   a	   threat	   to	   ‘life	   or	   person’.	   	   Evidence	   above	   shows	   that	  while	  
proof	  of	  a	  direct	  threat	  to	  life	  as	  a	  result	  of	  indiscriminate	  violence	  can	  result	  
in	  the	  provision	  of	  protection	  (though	  the	  threshold	   is	  high),	   indirect	  threats	  
are	  not	  even	  considered.	  This	  is	  surprising	  as	  the	  effects	  of	  indirect	  threats	  are	  
no	   different	   to	   the	   effects	   of	   direct	   threats	   (except	   perhaps,	   that	   indirect	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  In	  terms	  of	  UK	  Country	  Guidance	  cases,	  where	  assessment	  of	  the	  severity	  of	  internal	  armed	  conflict	  is	  by	  the	  number	  of	  
civilian	  casualties	  in	  a	  given	  geographical	  area.	  
40	  The	  cases	  of	  AK	  and	  GS.	  
41	  AK	  (Article	  15(c))	  Afghanistan	  CG	  [2012]	  UKUT	  00163	  (IAC)	  [1]	  
42	  ibid	  [80]	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threats	  are	  damaging	   in	  both	   the	   short	   and	   long-­‐term)	  and	  while	  applicants	  
can	   rarely	   ‘adduce	   sufficient	   evidence	   to	   prove	   there	   is	   a	   real	   risk	   to	   life	   or	  
person’43	  as	   a	   result	   of	   direct	   threats,	   the	   indirect	   threats	   are	   not	   even	  
accorded	  weight	  enough	  for	  consideration.	  	  
While	  a	  threat	  to	  ‘life’	   is	  fairly	  straightforward,	  a	  threat	  to	  ‘person’	  can	  
cover	  a	  much	  wider	   remit	  and	  be	  applied	  on	  a	  broader	  scale.	   In	   the	  case	  of	  
HM	   and	   Others44	  the	   Tribunal	   found	   that	   ‘life	   or	   person’	   ‘must	   extend	   to	  
significant	   physical	   injuries,	   serious	   mental	   traumas	   and	   serious	   threats	   to	  
bodily	   integrity’.45	  The	   judge	  went	   further	   to	  say	   that	   this	  broader	  definition	  
‘has	   significance	   for	   the	   type	   of	   evidence	   relevant	   to	   establishing	   whether	  
Article	  15(c)	  is	  engaged.	  Such	  evidence	  cannot	  be	  confined	  to	  the	  numbers	  of	  
casualties.’46	  
Looking	   at	   the	   evidence	   then,	   it	   appears	   that	  Article	   15(c)	   is	   currently	  
interpreted	   so	   narrowly	   as	   to	   provide	   protection	  where	   a	   person’s	   life	   is	   at	  
risk	   of	   serious	   harm,	   but	   not	   their	   ‘person’.47	  Or	   at	   least	   that	   yet	   another	  
definition	  of	  the	  terms	  in	  Article	  15(c)	  is	  lacking.	  	  
This	   contention	   that	   indirect	   threats	   should	   be	   considered	   when	  
determining	   the	   severity	   of	   an	   internal	   armed	   conflict	   is	   reiterated	   when	  
looking	  at	  Recital	  10	  of	  the	  Directive	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  respect	  for	  human	  
dignity.	  Each	  of	  the	  factors	  related	  to	  indirect	  threats	  mentioned	  above	  has	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Based	  on	  the	  case	  law	  of	  UK	  Country	  Guidance	  cases,	  and	  the	  cases	  of	  failed	  asylum	  seeker	  in	  Kent	  –	  where	  a	  common	  
reason	  for	  refusal	  was	  the	  failure	  to	  adduce	  sufficient	  evidence	  to	  prove	  a	  direct	  threat	  to	  life	  or	  person.	  
44	  HM	  and	  Others	  (Article	  15(c))	  Iraq	  CG	  [2010]	  UKUT	  331	  (IAC)	  
45	  AK	  (Article	  15(c))	  Afghanistan	  CG	  [2012]	  UKUT	  00163	  (IAC)	  [76]	  
46	  HM	  and	  Others	  (Article	  15(c))	  Iraq	  CG	  [2010]	  UKUT	  331	  (IAC)	  
47	  AK	  (Article	  15(c))	  Afghanistan	  CG	  [2012]	  UKUT	  00163	  (IAC)	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impact	  on	  human	  security	  and	  dignity,	   yet	   these	  are	   clearly	  not	  given	  much	  
attention	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  assessment	  of	  Article	  15(c)	  claims.48	  While	  the	  
concept	   of	   human	   dignity	   and	   security	   is	   not	   contained	  within	   Article	   15(c)	  
itself,	  it	  still	  retains	  importance	  through	  its	  incorporation	  into	  the	  Directive	  at	  
Recital	  10	  which	  states:	  ‘this	  Directive	  seeks	  to	  ensure	  full	  respect	  for	  human	  
dignity’.	  In	  arguing	  for	  a	  broader	  scope	  of	  application	  for	  Article	  15(c)	  it	  could	  
be	  said	  that	  human	  dignity	  falls	  under	  the	  definition	  of	   ‘life	  and	  person’	  and	  
should	  thereby	  be	  protected.49	  	  
	  
Conclusion:	  Is	  There	  a	  Purpose	  to	  Article	  15(c)	  and	  does	  it	  Provide	  any	  
Additional	  Rights	  to	  Applicants?	  
It	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  the	  above	  discussion	  that	  Article	  15(c)	  of	  the	  Qualification	  
Directive	   has	   a	   very	   complicated	   (and	   in	   some	   cases	   contradictory)	  
application.	  There	  have	  been	  clear	  difficulties	  in	  defining	  the	  terms	  within	  the	  
provision	   such	   as	   ‘individual	   threat’	   and	   ‘indiscriminate	   violence’	   and	   while	  
attempts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  define	  these	  terms,	  as	   in	  the	  case	  of	  Elgafaji,50	  
they	   have	   not	   proved	   helpful.	   The	   definition	   of	   individual	   harm	   being	  
‘irrespective	   of	   identity’	   still	   leaves	   a	   trail	   of	   questions	   as	   to	   what	   defines	  
harm	  not	  related	  to	  identity	  and	  how	  this	  can	  be	  proved	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  an	  
applicant	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  protection	  of	  Article	  15(c).	  The	  lack	  of	  a	  test	  for	  
exceptionality,	  where	  proof	  of	  exceptional	   circumstances	   is	  needed	   in	  order	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  HM	  and	  Others	  (Article	  15(c))	  Iraq	  CG	  [2010]	  UKUT	  331	  (IAC)	  –	  general	  argument	  from	  a	  judgment	  in	  the	  case,	  [76]	  
49	  Helene	  Lambert,	   ‘The	  Next	  Frontier:	  Expanding	  Protection	  in	  Europe	  for	  Victims	  of	  Armed	  Conflict	  and	  Indiscriminate	  
Violence’	  (2013)	  25	  IJRL	  207	  
50	  Elgafaji	  [2009]	  1	  WLR	  2100 
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for	   an	   applicant	   to	   succeed,	   only	   adds	   to	   the	   confusion	  of	   how	   to	   interpret	  
and	   apply	   Article	   15(c).	   Additionally,	   questions	   surrounding	   15(c)	   providing	  
scope	   for	   protection	   additional	   to	   that	   of	   15(a)	   and	   (b)	   still	   remain,	   with	  
arguments	   being	  made	   on	   both	   sides.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   cases	   such	   as	  AK,	  
Elgafaji	  and	  KH	  argue	  that	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  word	  ‘threat’	  contained	  in	  15(c),	  it	  
covers	   a	   lesser	   form	   of	   harm	   than	   (a)	   and	   (b)	   and	   should	   thereby	   be	  
considered	  separately	  from	  them.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  case	  of	  HH	  contends	  
that	  a	   ‘threat’	  of	  harm	  must	   lead	  onto	  the	  actual	  harm	  as	  defined	  in	  (a)	  and	  
(b)	  and	  therefore	  15(c)	  can	  never	  have	  any	  meaning	  independent	  those	  earlier	  
paragraphs.	  
Furthermore,	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘internal	  armed	  conflict’	  has	  proved	  equally	  
difficult	  to	  interpret	  and	  apply.	  The	  current	  application	  appears	  very	  narrow,	  
with	  the	  numbers	  of	  civilian	  casualties	  used	  as	  the	  main	  determining	  factor	  of	  
whether	   the	   conflict	   is	   severe	   enough	   to	   warrant	   protection.	   A	   strong	  
argument	  can	  be	  made	  for	  the	  application	  of	  other	  factors	  as	  determinants	  of	  
the	  severity	  of	  internal	  armed	  conflict,	  namely	  the	  human	  security	  paradigm.	  
The	   numbers	   of	   internally	   displaced	   persons	   and	   the	   issue	   of	   chronic	   state	  
failure	  leading	  to	  the	  unsustainability	  of	  communities	  are	  factors	  that	  are	  just	  
as	   important	   as	   the	   numbers	   of	   civilian	   casualties	   resulting	   from	   armed	  
conflict.	  To	  consider	  these	  factors	  would	  clarify	  the	  need	  for	  Article	  15(c)	  to	  be	  
considered	  separately	  from	  15(a)	  and	  (b)	  and	  Article	  2	  and	  3	  ECHR	  and	  would	  
accord	  more	  definition	  to	  the	  term	  ‘life	  or	  person’	  contained	  within	  15(c).	  	  
There	  is	  clearly	  a	  general	  lack	  of	  concrete	  definition	  or	  criteria	  by	  which	  
Member	   States,	   specifically	   the	  UK,	   can	   apply	   this	   element	  of	   the	  Directive,	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and	   as	   a	   result,	   applicants	   are	   rarely	   being	   accorded	   this	   type	   of	   subsidiary	  
protection.	   It	   does	   not	   appear	   to	   be	   providing	   any	   additional	   rights	   to	  
applicants,	   as	   cases	   are	   rarely	   successful,	   and	   even	   the	   judgments	   of	   failed	  
applications	   attest	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   interpretation	   and	   application	   of	   the	  
Directive	  is	  unclear.	  How	  can	  Article	  15(c)	  provide	  any	  rights,	  when	  applicants	  
do	   not	   know	   how	   to	   fulfill	   the	   criteria,	   and	   judges	   are	   uncertain	   on	   its	  
interpretation?	   These	   difficulties	   are	   all	   evidenced	   through	   several	   Country	  
Guidance	  cases,	  and	   local	  cases	  of	   failed	  asylum	  seekers.	  The	  same	  patterns	  
emerge	  in	  each	  case,	  bringing	  to	  light	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  courts	  have	  lost	  their	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